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Novel architectures and technologies carry with them an uncertainty related to their re-
liability and associated safety risk. Existing safety assessment methods involve determining
the severity of discrete functional failure and the corresponding probability. However, with
the advent of novel aircraft architectural and operational concepts, traditional methods of
establishing severity and probabilities failures are found lacking due to the scarcity of available
data. The current work proposes a safety assessment method that uses architecture-specific
performance models along with continuous functional hazard assessments to inform hazard
severity. The probability of failures is determined using a Bayesian framework that does not
falter when data is scarce. Taken together, it is expected that this new proposed methodology
will enable a more accurate safety assessment of novel aircraft architectures and technologies.
A safety assessment of an electric propulsion system powered by a fuel cell is conducted using
the proposed methodology to serve as a proof of concept.
Nomenclature
C-FHA = Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment
λ = Failure rate (per flight hour)
ȳ = Available failure data
a = Compliance action (decision)
X = True value of compliance finding (unknown)
δ = Decision rule
L(X, a) = Loss function
I. Introduction
General Aviation (GA) aircraft account for more than 90% of the registered civil aircraft fleet in the US [1]. Thissegment is likely to be at the forefront of a paradigm change in aviation where introduction of novel concepts
such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), architectures like e−VTOL, and technologies like hybrid electric propulsion are
expected to make aircraft more efficient and reduce their environmental footprint. However, these architectures carry
with them an uncertainty related to their reliability and the safety risk they pose. To ensure the continued safety of the
GA fleet and operations in this rapidly evolving new paradigm, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented
a new set of performance-based certification rules for Normal Category Aircraft in Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), Part 23, Amendment 64 [2]. Compliance with these rules can now be shown using means of
compliance information given in approved consensus standards like those developed by ASTM Committee F44 on
General Aviation Aircraft [3, 4]. While a parallel effort looks at simplifying the documentation process involved in
certification using a Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) approach [5], of particular interest in this paper is FAR
§23.2510 which requires that all equipment, systems, and installations have [2]
“a logical and acceptable inverse relationship between the average probability and the severity of failure conditions.”
It is paramount for aircraft designers to have the capability to quantify safety risk earlier in the design phases to help
mitigate avoidable surprises once the aircraft is already built. Safety risk is generally quantified as a combination of two
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Assessment Level
Failure Condition Classification





<10−3 <10−4 <10−5 <10−6
II <10−3 <10−5 <10−6 <10−7
III <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−8
IV <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−9
Table 1 Quantitative Allowable Failure Rate for Different Failure Conditions [8] ∗
entities – the probability of a failure or an unsafe event, and the severity associated with it [6]. The probability of a
failure or an unsafe event is the frequency with which it can be expected to occur, and is generally quantified using
historical data [7]. The severity of failure denotes the impact of failure, and is generally classified into five categories
depending on whether such failure puts life or property in harms way. Table 1 shows the failure classification conditions
and the corresponding allowable failure rates for GA aircraft [6, 8]. Generally speaking, the severity is defined as – (i)
Catastrophic when there is a chance of multiple fatalities and/or total loss of aircraft (ii) Hazardous when it may result
in serious injuries or some loss of life (iii) Major when there is a significant reduction in safety or functional capability
of the aircraft with expected safe flight, and (iv) Minor when there may be little loss of safety margins but no expected
injuries or damage [9].
The intent of safety assessments is to ensure that any system under consideration poses no worse than an acceptable
level of risk. SAE ARP4754A and SAE ARP4761 act as accepted and well established guides for performing safety
assessments [6, 10]. In the early design phase, ARP4761 suggests conducting a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA),
which is defined as [6]:
“A systematic, comprehensive examination of functions to identify and classify failure conditions of those functions according
to their severity.”
The aircraft and system level FHA aims at identifying the hazards associated with functional failure at the corresponding
levels while including considerations for environmental conditions and flight phase. This usually results in two types
of functional requirements – (i) Availability (e.g. the loss of function), and (ii) Integrity (e.g. Malfunction) [11].
The allowable probability of functional failure is determined by Table 1 once the corresponding hazard severity is
established. Once FHAs are completed, airplane and system functional designs or architectures are proposed to meet
the generated safety requirements. The verification of functional designs take the form of a numerical analysis [11].
There are two types of analysis methods prescribed to complete this – (i) Top-Down methods that include dependency
diagrams, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) among others, and (ii) Bottom-Up methods that include the Failure Mode Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Figure 1 shows an overview of the relationship between FHA and FTA in conceptual
and preliminary design. FTA, which forms an important component of Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA)
(see Fig. 1), is verified using FMECA by postulating failure mechanisms at the component level, and with the addition
of failure probability data should give a close correlation to the FTA conducted [9]. As the design progresses from
the conceptual phase to the preliminary phase, functional safety assessments are followed by physical assessments
that focus on physical layout and validate the redundancy and independence assumptions made. Finally, operational
safety requirements are generated out of unusual scenarios, with unsatisfactory results being fed back into the design
process [11].
It is important to note that the current paradigm seeks to identify hazards early in the design process and percolate
corresponding qualitative or quantitative safety requirements downstream. Washington et al.[12] summarize the outcome
of the system safety assessment process as four related sets F,C,Λ and O where:
1) F is the set of n identified failure conditions f1 − fn
2) C is the set of severities ci assigned to each failure condition fi
3) Λ is the set of probabilities λi of each failure condition fi , and
4) O is the set of failure probability objective oi associated with fi and its severity ci as given by table 1
The current safety assessment paradigm is not without its limitations. In the conceptual and preliminary design
phase, the existing approach of safety assessment seeks to limit the risk posed by any failure condition fi by ensuring
that the probability of said failure λi is less than its probability objective oi as determined by Table 1 using severity
∗Assessment levels for General Aviation (GA) aircraft are defined based on the number of passengers[13]
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Fig. 1 Overview of safety assessment methods in conceptual and preliminary design: Relationship between
FHAs and FTAs [6]
ci . Traditional FHA is a tabular approach in which discrete functional failures are assigned a discrete hazard severity
as shown in Table 1. This makes the process slow and time consuming, requiring an analyst to analyse every unique
architecture configuration manually, thus limiting the scope for design space exploration in the early design phase. At
the same time, novel architectures and technologies may not have discrete functional failures, and their consequences
may not be well understood. Qualifying a functional failure discretely merely as loss of function or malfunction may
not provide the full picture in terms severity of said failures. One solution in the traditional approach is to assign a
conservative estimate to the severity posed, resulting in incorrect unit level probability requirements (oi) in the early
design process. As Armstrong states in his PhD thesis [14]:
“Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and hazard severity employed during traditional Functional
Hazard Assessment bias architecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.”
Consider for instance a Distributed Electric Propulsion (DEP) concept. Instead of the traditional scenarios (loss of thrust/
one engine out), the DEP is likely to have a spectrum of thrust degradation scenarios (0% to 100% thrust loss). Since
there is little historical precedent to these architectures and scenarios, the current approaches fall short in qualifying
the severity of functional degradation and can potentially result in incorrect functional hazard severity allocation. At
the same time, ARP 4761 cannot comprehensively address uncertainty in input data and models [12]. Uncertainty is
generally classified into two categories [15]:
• Epistemic Uncertainty (Greek ’episteme’: knowledge) is also called knowledge-based uncertainty that results
from incomplete knowledge or understanding about fundamental phenomenon. This uncertainty is significant in
situations where not enough evidence or data is available.
• Aleatory Uncertainty (Greek ’alea’: game of chance) is the second type of uncertainty and relates to the inherent
randomness or stochasticity of a system that is not reducible.
The common method used to determine probability of an event (component failure for instance) in ARP4761[6]
is using what is called a ‘Frequentist approach’ by modern statisticians. The Frequentist approach can only take
aleatory uncertainties into account through data that is available [15]. To mitigate this downside, ARP4761 suggests in
making conservative assumptions to deal with its limitations and manage uncertainty better [6, 12]. However, with
novel architectures and concepts of operation, data available are insufficient and epistemic uncertainty is large, thus
rendering existing (Frequentist) probability models unsuitable [12, 16]. It is on this premise that the current work is
motivated. The intent of this paper is to supplement the current safety assessment techniques (See [6, 9, 11, 17–19])
with a methodology that can address the shortcomings mentioned above.
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(a) Hazard severity with continuous functional degradation
(b) Allowable failure rate for the given severity curve
Fig. 2 Notional plot of the C-FHA process
The rest of this paper focuses on describing the proposed approach (Sec II), showcasing the proposed approach
using a case study on a fuel cell propulsion system (Sec III), followed by conclusions (Sec IV).
II. The Proposed Bayesian Safety Assessment Methodology
The proposed approach seeks to supplement existing methods by addressing some of the limitations mentioned in
Sec. I. In particular, the new approach differs from the traditional methods in both determining probability of failures as
well as establishing the severity associated with them. The approach also seeks to enable design space exploration
to be conducted in early design phases while including system safety considerations. The new approach is shown in
Fig. 4, the important components of which are a Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment (C-FHA) and a Bayesian
Probability Assessment. These are discussed in greater detail below:
A. Severity Assessment: Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment
The functional decomposition of a novel system architecture or technology is likely to remain similar to a conventional
system even if the implementation varies drastically between the two. For example, an airborne system is likely to have
a function Generate Lift to stay airborne, or Provide Thrust to translate irrespective of whether it is a conventional tube
and wing aircraft or a distributed electric VTOL concept. Traditional Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) utilizes this
knowledge to keep implementation and behavioral spaces independent while characterizing hazards [20]. Traditional
FHA considers discrete off-nominal scenarios, for e.g. – 1)loss of function, 2) excess function, and 3)incorrect operation
of function. However, as explained in Sec. I for novel concepts and architectures, it is important to differentiate
off-nominal scenarios that can result in continuous functional degradation.
Armstrong made a case for Continuous FHA (C-FHA) that assigns a continuous hazard severity that depends on
continuous functional degradation [14]. C-FHA extends the traditional FHA and system safety analysis methods to
consider the magnitude of function loss when assessing an architecture or a concept and is notionally shown in Fig. 2.
As a first step, the analyst defines safety critical metrics of interest under functional degradation scenarios for different
flight phases. For example, when the aircraft function of interest is ‘Provide Thrust’, metrics like required Take-off
Field Length (TOFL) or required climb gradient can be computed using the information available in early design phases
under thrust degradation scenarios. With additional knowledge about the aircraft concept like a calibrated 6-DoF model,
metrics like abnormal attitude, airspeed, angular rates, asymmetric forces, or flight trajectory – that correlate to loss
of control situations can be computed for a thrust degradation scenario to paint an accurate picture of the aircraft’s
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departure from safe operation. Energy based metrics for safety analysis like those described by Puranik [21, 22] can
also be considered for this purpose. Second, these metrics are calculated based on available performance models of the
appropriate fidelity under functional degradation scenarios. The results of such functional degradation scenarios for
different flight phases can then be combined and translated into hazard severity curves for the given scenario or phase
of flight by decision makers leading to the creation of C-FHA curves. Generating continuous hazard severity curves
instead of discrete values suggested by Table 1 can allow decision makers to account for uncertainty in the models
utilized to compute safety metrics of interest [14].
Figure 2 provides a notional plot showing how hazard severity can be obtained as a function of continuous functional
degradation while also showing how the generated hazard severity-function loss curve can be translated into an allowable
failure rate-function loss curve using Table 1. The effect of functional degradation is computed on various safety
metrics using available models for a particular flight phase. Decision makers can then utilize this knowledge to define
hazard severity curves for every case, which can then be combined into one hazard severity curve for the function under
consideration for the flight phase of interest. This final hazard severity - function loss curve now provides a physics
backed relationship between the two, as opposed to a heuristic and case by case approach provided by traditional FHA.
The continuous hazard severity results in safety requirements that are allocated to the system level function in terms of
allowable failure rate (see Table 1). Failures in subsystems or components are likely to result in degradation in the
system’s capability to perform certain functions. A model that can determine the effect of component failure to the
system level functions can now be utilized to generate component level reliability requirements based on generated
hazard severity-functional degradation relationship. As shown in Fig. 2, if the failure of component A or B results
in a 50% and 25% functional degradation at the system level, the requirement for allowable failure rates for these
components can be generated using the same plot. In reality, such a model will need to be combined with a reliability
block diagram (RBD) to determine system reliability requirements as a function of functional degradation scenarios.
The C-FHA method described above can allow engineers to (i) Determine a physics backed relation between
functional degradation scenarios and corresponding hazard severity levels using performance and modeling tools
available in the corresponding design phase, and (ii) Allocate system level failure rate requirements accurately to the
component level. Since C-FHA utilizes knowledge of the system in terms of performance models available at the time
of conducting this analysis, this method can be utilized to model novel aircraft concepts, architectures, and technologies
by utilizing information available in early design phases. As the design matures, C-FHA allows engineers to update the
failure rate requirements generated by utilizing higher fidelity models to determine the effects of functional degradation
on system safety metrics. Additionally, decision makers only need to interact with C-FHA to determine the appropriate
hazard severity curves to be used. All other aspects of this method can be easily automated to allow a design space
exploration exercise while considering component reliability requirements.
B. Bayesian Probability Assessment
A Bayesian approach of estimating probability allows for the treatment of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty
even when available data is limited. Instead of only using data, a Bayesian approach relies on using information - which
includes data, models, and other available information like subject matter expert (SME) knowledge [16]. Furthermore, a
Bayesian inference model can be continuously updated as additional information becomes available. Bayesian inference
techniques for safety and reliability assessment have been applied to numerous problems in literature [23–26] and are
considered mature and mathematically sound for the purpose. The utility of this approach can be attested to when one
considers that numerous industries consider these techniques standard [27–30].
Under the Bayesian framework, uncertainty in the failure rate (λ) conditioned over available failure data (ȳ) is given
by the conditional distribution p(λ | ȳ) as given by Eq. 1




Equation 1 gives the Bayesian posterior distribution p(λ | ȳ) based on the likelihood of observing the data that was
observed p(ȳ |λ), and the analyst’s prior belief p(λ) normalized over all realizations of the data p(ȳ). Note that Eq. 1 is
simply a statement of Bayes’ theorem applied to multiple independent identically distributed observations ȳ.
1. Likelihood Distribution
The likelihood p(ȳ |λ) is a function of λ that seeks to determine the likelihood of the observed data ȳ given λ. It
is a statistical model used to represent the aleatory uncertainty associated with the data and its underlying physical
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Fig. 3 Guidelines for selecting the Likelihood and Conjugate Prior Distributions [16]
phenomenon [12].
The three most common distributions used to model aleatory uncertainty are the Binomial, Poisson, and Exponential
distributions [16]. Figure 3 provides a guideline for the different types of likelihoods that can be used to model failure
phenomenon related to aerospace operations. As can be seen in Fig. 3, a Binomial distribution is generally used to
model failures on demand, a Poisson distribution is used when there are failures in time or initiating event, and an
Exponential distribution is used when the time to failure or time to recover are being modeled.
2. Prior Distribution
The prior distribution p(λ) captures information that is denoted by the analyst’s subjective state of belief regarding
the failure rate. Since this distribution is based on the analyst’s knowledge about the component or event, it captures the
epistemic uncertainty associated with estimating the failure rate (λ) [12]. Informative and non-informative priors are
two broad categories of prior distributions. The non-informative priors seek to minimize the information bias within a
prior and let the data dominate the posterior. Informative priors contain information that can influence the posterior and
can be generated by combining the analyst’s own knowledge with SME opinion on the unknown parameter (λ)[16].
Additionally, conjugate priors can be used with certain likelihood functions to ensure that the posterior follows the same
family of distributions. This can allow an analyst to have analytical solutions for the posterior and simplify calculations.
In cases of non-conjugate priors, numerical methods like Markov Chain Monte Carlo can be used to determine the
posterior.
If an event has a probability of zero set by the prior, no amount of data observed otherwise can change the posterior.
It is for this reason that prior choices need to be made carefully by the analyst. Additionally, in the absence of data, the
prior distribution becomes the posterior! Figure 3 provides suggestions on appropriate prior distributions that can be
used for certain cases pertinent to aerospace applications. The reader is directed to the work of Dezfuli et al. [16], which
provides comprehensive guidance on selecting the appropriate distributions to model the priors by considering opinion
of SMEs and available data for component failures in other domain applications among other cases.
3. Posterior Distribution
The likelihood function multiplied by the prior distribution gives a joint distribution of the data and parameter λ.
The normalizing constant in the denominator p(ȳ) can be obtained by integrating λ out of this joint distribution to give
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Fig. 4 Proposed methodology for safety assessment integrated with design of novel architectures
the posterior distribution given by Eq. 2.





This posterior distribution provides an updated state of knowledge of the failure rate taking into account the analyst’s
subjective state of belief and available data. Certain heritage data can also be utilized by eliciting its applicability from
subject matter experts (SMEs), and averaging the posterior distributions according to the applicability of the data [16].
If there are no data available, the posterior is the same as the prior. The prior influence on the posterior reduces as
more and more data become available, resulting in the posterior moving closer towards the Frequentist estimate. A
Bayesian approach has numerous benefits over the traditional Frequentist approach (in addition to treating uncertainty
more comprehensively) for application to safety assessment of novel aircraft concepts.
• The Bayesian posterior can be continuously updated as more data become available. This is done by treating the
existing posterior as a prior for the new data and generating a new posterior.
• A 95% posterior credible interval for λ has a 95% probability of the true value of λ lying within it [31], unlike the
more complicated interpretation of Frequentist confidence intervals.†
C. Integrated Risk and Compliance Assessment: A Bayesian Decision Framework
Figure 4 provides an overview of the overall risk assessment method proposed here. It is assumed that the
configuration has been sized and adequate performance models are available to determine the level of functional
degradation if certain components fail. The proposed method begins with the C-FHA method described in Sec. II.A.
System level safety-critical functions are defined and the effect of a continuous degradation in said functions on safety
critical metrics of interest is determined to allow decision makers to allocate hazard severity. At the same time, effect of
subsystem or component level failures in terms of function loss is computed using the performance models available.
Next, combining the severity allocated to functional degradation, the effect of component failure in terms of system
function-loss, and the allowable failure rate determined from Table 1, probability requirements are allocated to the
subsystems or components of interest. Finally, the probabilities of component failures can be estimated using a Bayesian
approach as explained in Sec. II.B. The combination of C-FHA to yield component level reliability requirements and
Bayesian probability estimation to yield posterior distributions of component failure rates λ allows the analyst to compute
†A 95% Frequentist confidence interval states that if a sample of failure data were collected a large number of times, 95% of the generated
confidence intervals will contain the true λ [31]; an interpretation that is not very useful in the current application.
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Fig. 5 Integrated Risk Assessment - Probability of meeting component reliability requirements
the probability with which reliability requirements can be met. This is shown notionally in Fig. 5. The probability that
component B can meet the reliability requirement is given by the dashed line showing p(λposterior < λallowable) on the
CDF of the posterior failure rate of B.
Decision makers now need to make a decision on whether the corresponding probability of meeting requirements is
good enough to consider component B (See Fig. 5) within the architecture under consideration, compliant with the safety
requirements. In a Bayesian decision theoretic setup, such a compliance decision regarding component B is considered
an action a ∈ A (A = {compliant, non − compliant}). The action to be taken as a function of observation or data is
considered a decision rule (δ). Finally, a loss function L(X, a) represents the penalty to be paid if the analyst chooses
action a, under available information p(λposterior < λallowable), when the true value of the compliance finding is
X = {compliant} or X = {non − compliant}. The Bayesian expected loss is the expectation of the loss function with




L(X, a)p(λ | ȳ)δλ (3)
An action a∗ that minimizes the expected loss given by Eq. 3 should be the action taken by the analyst, and is called
Bayes action. It is important to note that this Bayes decision framework provides the analyst with a mathematically
defensible method of making compliance finding with safety requirements while accounting for epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty. This proposed framework can thus address some of the limitations of the traditional safety assessment
process for novel system concepts, architectures, and technologies.
The next section focuses on demonstrating the methodology discussed in Sec. II on a notional fuel cell power system
for GA aircraft. In this paper, a simple loss function in terms of a loss matrix will be considered for demonstration (see
Sec. III.C).
III. Case Study: A Fuel Cell Power System
A fuel cell is a device that uses electro-chemical reactions to convert chemical energy into electricity. The reactants
are the fuel – usually Hydrogen gas, and an oxidizing agent. These reactants flow in at the anode and cathode respectively
where they react with the electrolyte and produce water and electricity. A notional fuel cell is depicted in Fig. 6. For
practical applications, a number of fuel cells are connected to form a fuel cell stack. With the help of an electric motor
powered propeller, such a system can be adapted for aircraft propulsion.
Although the reactants and the end products are similar to a combustion reaction, there are a few key differences.
The energy released in the reaction is in the form of electric current rather than heat. The temperatures at which the
oxidation occurs is also much lower than a typical combustion temperature. The reaction mechanism itself is also quite
different. A typical mechanism for an acidic fuel cell follows these steps.
1) Hydrogen gas enters the anode side of the cell. This gas may be either stored in fuel tanks directly or produced
from other compounds such as methanol in a reformer. At the anode, the gas dissociates into protons and
electrons. The protons enter the acidic electrolyte and the electrons are left at the anode
2H2 −→ 4H+ + 4e− (4)
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Fig. 6 Schematic of a notional proton conducting fuel cell [32]
2) The oxidizing agent flows at the cathode where it reacts with the protons to form water.
O2 + 4H+ + 4e− −→ 2H2O (5)
3) The protons flow through the proton conducting electrolyte. An external circuit is created which links the two
electrodes. This enables the electrons to flow from the anode to the cathode, thus constituting an electric current.
When used for transport applications, the type of fuel cell used is generally dominated by its power to weight ratio. As a
result, the Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) type of fuel cell a common choice for such applications due to its low
weight and volume. The mechanism of this cell is similar to that of an acidic fuel cell as the electrolyte promotes the
movement of protons. In order to optimize the performance, a number of design features are often incorporated to
increase the efficiency and power output [33].
• To speed up the reaction, platinum is used as a catalyst. The construction involves careful placement of platinum
particles on graphite electrodes. Further, since the reaction site has to host the reactant gases, the electrolyte is
built as a porous membrane.
• For increased power output, the reactants gases are fed in at high pressure. If ambient air is being used as an
oxidizing agent, then the partial pressure of oxygen has to be raised accordingly.
• As with many other chemical reactions, the rate of the reaction is highly dependent on the temperature, with a
higher rate of reaction at higher temperatures. There is an upper limit to the benefit of raising the temperature as
beyond a certain point, there is significant degradation to the intricate construction of the cell itself.
Although fuel cells propulsion systems are well understood for automobiles, they are still an upcoming concept for
aviation. The operating envelope for an aircraft contains highly variable ambient conditions than an automobile might
experience. There is a need to study the performance of fuel cell propulsion systems at these extreme conditions to assess
their implications on aircraft safety. In this case study, a fuel cell propulsion system is modeled from first principles. To
maintain efficiency and sufficient power outputs, several external components are used to condition the ambient airflow
before it reaches the cathode. A generic model of a fuel cell based propulsion system adapted for aviation use is shown
in Fig. 7. The components, in the order experienced by the airflow are a compressor, heat exchanger and a humidifier.
• The compressor is needed to raise the partial pressure of oxygen in order to increase power output from the fuel
cell stack. The compressor also ensures adequate mass flow through to the cathode of the fuel cell stack.
• A heat exchanger is needed to condition the temperature of the flow. Typically, the compression in the previous
step raises the temperature beyond what is required, thus, the heat exchanger must cool the flow.
• A humidifier is needed to keep the polymer membrane saturated with water. Water is a key element to proton
conduction and plays a part in the efficiency of the cell. A dried out membrane is also prone to cracking which
will greatly diminish the efficiency of the fuel cell due to the reactants leaking across the opposite electrodes [33].
For this study, a physics based performance model was developed in MATLAB as shown in Fig. 8. The anode side
of the system is unaffected by ambient air, and has been excluded from modeling efforts. The various components on
the cathode side are modeled based on simple physics and are calibrated to the current state of the art. This model can
predict the power output of the fuel cell by quantifying the temperature, pressure and humidity of the flow as it passes
through the components.
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Fig. 7 Schematic of a generic fuel cell system for aviation use
The compressor is modeled as a two stage supercharger, with identical stages. The isentropic efficiency of the two
stages was assumed to be 0.75 and the pressure ratio for each stage is calculated from the total pressure ratio which is
the desired nominal output pressure divided by the ambient pressure. A more detailed model could include compressor
maps but a constant point assumption is considered adequate for this simple case study. The desired back pressure at
nominal operating conditions is assumed to be 30 psi. The output temperature, relative humidity and work required
are calculated using simple isentropic and thermodynamic relations. The power required to run the compressor is
provided by an electric motor which is powered through the fuel cell itself. Next, the heat exchanger is modeled as
a heat transfer unit. The required heat removal (or addition) is calculated by assuming a target temperature of 80°C.
Finally, the humidifier increases the humidity of the air to about 60% which is ideal for the fuel cell membrane [34].
For this study the focus is on modeling the effects of compressor performance degradation on the power output
of the propulsion system. This is achieved through two parameters, the first being the mass flow rate of air through
the system. The second is a scale factor related to the drop in the compressor’s ability to increase the pressure of the
output flow. Both of these parameters are added to the model and directly affect the performance of the system. The
effect on system performance is captured by the ratio of the power output at current operating condition, which includes
compressor performance degradation over the nominal system performance. Note that the nominal system performance
is not a constant value, but changes with ambient altitude and weather.
Fig. 8 Schematic of a first-principles performance model of the fuel cell system under consideration
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A. Using C-FHA to Establish Hazard Severity and Component Requirements
The present case study will demonstrate the Bayesian safety assessment methodology explained in Sec. II for a
hypothetical reference aircraft with performance parameters identical to those reported for the X-57-F by Borer et
al. [35]. The X-57-F is a fuel cell powered variant of the X-57 Mod II distributed electric aircraft concept being designed
by NASA for the Scalable Convergent Electric Propulsion Technology Operations Research (SCEPTOR) program.
Since the purpose of this case study is to merely demonstrate the proposed safety assessment method, the performance
model of Borer et al. [35] is assumed valid, although the X-57-F is slated to utilize a Solid Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) as
against a PEM fuel cell considered for this case study. The present case study will consider the Take-off Field Length
(TOFL) as a safety critical parameter of interest under power degradation scenarios.
1. Reference Aircraft Sizing and Performance
Sizing and performance of the reference aircraft is based on the X-57-F as mentioned above and includes information
available during the early design phase. The drag polar published by Borer et al. [35] is fitted with a quadratic polynomial
in the lift coefficient to give,
CD = 0.0282 + 0.0483 · C2L (6)
Additional parameters of interest for the hypothetical aircraft (same as X-57-F) are given in Table 2.
2. Take-Off Analysis
For the take-off phase of flight, TOFL required is considered as the safety metric of interest under a loss of power
scenario to determine hazard severity. The derivation of TOFL in the event of a continuous power degradation scenario
is inspired by the work of Armstrong [14], and given in Appendix A. Eq. 29 in conjunction with Eq. 24, 30 – 32 can be
used to compute the TOFL required for the reference aircraft under a given failure scenario. If this TOFL required
is greater than the TOFL available at the airport, the hazard severity can be considered to be catastrophic. Figure 9
shows the variation of TOFL required with a continuous loss of power and a range of TOFL available on a hot day for a
airports located at an altitude of 9000 feet above mean sea level. The high altitude hot day condition is chosen as one
of the most critical take-off conditions that the reference aircraft may have to face. The red areas show where TOFL
required is greater than TOFL available, suggesting the presence of a catastrophic hazard in those conditions. Blue
areas suggest areas where sufficient runway may be available to either abort or continue take-off procedure to reach VTO
after a failure causing partial loss of power. Yellow areas suggest the TOFL required is almost equal to TOFL available,
suggesting decision makers to remain cautious while assigning hazard severity to these cases.
Fig. 9 Required TOFL as a function of TOFL available and Power available after failure
For the case study of interest, TOFL available is fixed at 2000 feet. While this would be considered inadequate for
most commercial airports, it is not an unreasonable assumption for a general aviation aircraft. The corresponding TOFL
required to available ratio is also shown by Fig. 9, with the red line providing a conservative estimate regarding when to
consider the hazard catastrophic to account for uncertainty in model parameters.
3. Allocating Reliability Requirements at the Component Level
The next step in the C-FHA process is to determine the effect of component failure or degradation on the system










PEM FC Power 120 kW
Take-Off Battery Power 38 kW
Table 2 Reference aircraft: Summary of parameters of interest
will be considered by quantifying their effect on power available during take-off. In realistic scenarios, a reliability
block diagram (RBD) will need to be constructed to determine the overall system reliability with respect to functional
degradation scenarios. For this case study, it is sufficient to assume independent failures of the battery and the compressor
since these systems are connected to the electric motors in parallel, and the probability of both failing together can be
neglected.
The battery is the simpler case of the two. For the reference aircraft under consideration, the battery supplies 38 kW
of power for take-off as given by table 2. Thus, battery failure means a power degradation of 24%, which means the
aircraft will have only 76% power available since it is installed in parallel to the fuel cell.
In the case of a compressor, a seal / gasket failure, bearing failure, and a valve failure explain more than 80% of the
failure modes observed [36]. These failure generally result in a degradation in the compressor’s performance rather than
a total failure. To model the degraded pressure output of the compressor, a scale factor is applied to the output flow
pressure. The second parameter which is affected is the mass flow rate of air through the system to the cathode of the
fuel cell stack. To obtain the critical output degradation case, the scale factor is varied from 1.0 to 0.5 in decrements of
0.1. The nominal air flow, calculated to be 0.085 kg/s, is varied in decrements of 0.005 kg/s to 0.05 kg/s. For a higher
fidelity modeling, the coupling between output flow pressure and mass flow rate can be established through the use of a
compressor map. The effect of the mass flow rate on the power output is easy to model. Since the quantity of reactants
decreases, the power decreases by an equal ratio. The effect of the pressure on the reaction is more involved and is
modeled here through the Nerst Equation for this reaction as shown in Eq. 7 [37]. Note that the Nernst equation only
models the effect on the individual fuel cell voltages but not power output directly. Here, the current density output
is assumed to be unchanged and thus does not affect the power output. The effect of pressure on the current density
requires a high fidelity model of the stack, which is outside the scope of this paper.









The most critical case is found to be the one where the output pressure scale factor is 0.5 and the mass flow is 0.05
kg/s at an altitude of 9000 feet on a hot day (+450F). This results in a drop of fuel cell output power by about 42%. This
means that the combined fuel cell + battery system can provide only 68% of the power required for take-off. Figure 10
shows the outputs of the C-FHA process applied to the compressor that supplies the fuel cell with compressed air, and
the battery that is connected in parallel to the fuel cell. While the compressor performance degradation results in a
hazardous condition, battery failure results in a condition somewhere between hazardous and major in severity. Since
the hypothetical reference aircraft is assumed to be identical to the X-57-F, it falls under assessment level I as given in
table 1. Thus, compressor degradation should have a failure rate of < 10−5 while battery failure should have a failure
rate of roughly < 5 × 10−5. These values will be used in the compliance findings to be made.
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Fig. 10 C-FHA results: Component failure rate requirements
B. Evaluating Probability of Component Failures
Two analysts A and B are considered to evaluate the probability of failure of the battery and the compressor. For both
components, a Poisson likelihood model is assumed since failures generally occur during operation with the number of
failures and corresponding operating time being the information documented. Both analysts work off a common set of
gathered data for the two components as given in Table 6 found in Appendix B. This data is gathered after both analysts
decide on the prior distributions.
1. Posterior Estimation: Battery Failure
Analyst A does not have much knowledge about battery failures, and thus utilizes a Jeffrey’s non-informative
prior to represent the epistemic uncertainty in the failure rate so as to not bias the posterior. For a Poisson likelihood,
the Jeffrey’s non-informative prior is a Gamma distribution with shape parameter αprior = 0.5, and rate parameter
βprior = 0. While this prior is not proper (its integral over all possible values of λ is not 1), the posterior that results is
proper. Generating the likelihood distributions using data given in Table 6 found in Appendix B, the posterior is given
by a Gamma distribution with shape αposterior = 0.5 + Σyi , and the rate βposterior = 0 + Σti [16].
Prior : λpriorA ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (8)




Posterior : λposteriorA | ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5 + Σyi, β = 0 + Σti)
: λposteriorA | ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 17, β = 11922301) (10)
Eq. 10 gives Analyst A’s posterior on the failure rate of battery. Analyst B also decides to use a Jeffry’s prior for
the battery, but disagrees with Analyst A’s choice of utilizing data generated for non-Li-ion batteries for computing
the failure rate. Analyst B finds out that Boeing 787 reported two battery safety events in about 104000 combined
flight hours of battery operation (2 batteries per aircraft, 52000 flight hours) [38]. Knowing that the battery on 787 is a
Li-ion battery, Analyst B decides to utilize a method that weighs the two evidence sets [16]. Analyst B decides that the
probability that the heritage data applies to the new architecture is 10%, while the probability the Boeing 787’s data
applies is 100%. As a result, the data sets are weighted as follows:
Applicable Data = 0.9 × (B787 data) + 0.1 × (B787 + Heritage data)
The resulting posterior for the battery failure rate for Analyst B is then given by Eq. 11.
λposteriorB | ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5 + 0.1(16.5 + 2) + 0.9(2), β = 0.1(11922301 + 104000) + 0.9(104000))
∼ Gamma(α = 4.15, β = 1296230) (11)
2. Posterior Estimation: Compressor Failure
For the compressor failure rate estimation, Analyst A again assumes a Jeffrey’s prior given in Eq. 8. Using a Poisson
likelihood given by Eq. 9 and the data given in Table 6 found in Appendix B, Analyst A generates the following posterior
for compressor failure rate,
λposteriorA | ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 14.5, β = 336700) (12)
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Fig. 11 Posteriors for the battery and compressor failure rate
Analyst B happens to be familiar with compressor design and knows that a typical compressor is designed to have a
5% failure rate after 25,000 hours of operation [39]. That is equivalent to having 5 failures in 100, after operating for
25,000 hours each. Thus, Analyst B’s prior is given by Eq. 13
λpriorB ∼ Gamma(α = 5, β = 2.5 · 10
6) (13)
λposteriorB ∼ Gamma(α = 19, β = 2836700) (14)
Figure 11 shows the posteriors for battery and compressor failure computed by Analyst A and Analyst B. Since
Analyst B considers heritage data for battery failure less applicable compared to more recent data from the Boeing 787
with a much higher failure rate, we can see that the corresponding posterior is more spread out compared to Analyst A’s
posterior and suggests higher uncertainty in its true value. For the compressor, Analyst B utilizes SME knowledge on
compressor failure rate to highly bias the failure rate towards the left with an informative prior. As a result, the value
and spread for Analyst B’s compressor failure rate is seen to be much lower compared to Analyst A. With the posterior
probabilities now ready, the two analysts can proceed to make a compliance assessment.
C. Making a Compliance Assessment
With the component level reliability (allowable failure rate) requirement available from Sec. III.A.3 and failure rate
posterior available from Sec. III.B, Analyst A and Analyst B can utilize the Bayesian decision framework described in
Sec. II.C to make a compliance finding. The loss function agreed upon by both analysts in consultation with regulators
is given in Table 3. The rational behind this loss function is as follows: (i) Finding a component to be compliant when in
fact it is not can be a costly mistake and is therefore penalized the highest, (ii) Finding a component to be non-compliant
when in fact it is compliant, while undesirable, is not as undesirable as the previous case, and is therefore penalized to a
lesser extent, (iii) Finding a component to be (non-) compliant when it is in fact (non-) compliant is desirable, and is
given a negative score to indicate a negative loss (desirable). The loss function considered here is merely an example
and can be customized by decision makers as needed in order to better suit their purpose.
True State Decision Action a
X a1 = {Compliant} a2 = {Non − Compliant}
X1 = {Compliant} -2 1
X2 = {Non − Compliant} 4 -2
Table 3 Loss function L(X, a)
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Fig. 12 Posterior CDFs to determine pA and pB
The Bayesian expected loss given by Eq. 3 gets simplified because of the loss function provided by Table 3 to give,
ρ(a1, pA) = L(X1, a1) · pA + L(X2, a1) · (1 − pA) (15)
ρ(a2, pA) = L(X1, a2) · pA + L(X2, a2) · (1 − pA) (16)
ρ(a1, pB) = L(X1, a1) · pB + L(X2, a1) · (1 − pB) (17)
ρ(a2, pB) = L(X2, a1) · pB + L(X2, a2) · (1 − pB) (18)
Where pA and pB are the probability of the component meeting its requirements computed via the posterior CDFs (see
Fig. 12) of Analyst A or Analyst B respectively and are given in Table 4. As stated in Sec. II.C, the minimum of the
expected loss given by equations 15-16 should inform the compliance action to be taken by Analyst A (and similarly by
Analyst B).
p(λposterior < λallowable)
Component Analyst A Analyst B
Compressor 5.786 × 10−6 0.967
Battery 1 0.999
Table 4 Probability of meeting failure rate requirements
Table 5 gives the expected loss for the decision actions a1, a2 for Analyst A and Analyst B for the two components
of interest.
Analyst A Analyst B
Component ρ(a1, pA) ρ(a2, pA) ρ(a1, pB) ρ(a2, pB)
Compressor 4 -2 -1.802 0.901
Battery -2 1 -1.994 0.997
Table 5 Expected loss due to available decision actions for the two analysts
The decision action that minimizes the expected loss is considered Bayes action and should be chosen. It is clear from
table 5 that Analyst A should find the battery a1 = {complaint}, while finding the compressor a2 = {non− compliant}.
At the same time, Analyst B should find both the battery and the compressor a1 = {compliant}. This difference in
outcomes can be attributed to the prior chosen by Analyst B for modeling the epistemic uncertainty in the compressor
failure rate which biased the posterior towards lower values.
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IV. Conclusions and Future Work
Existing safety assessment methods fall short when it comes to assessing failure probability and severity for novel
aircraft concepts and technologies due to the lack of available data. The present work proposes a safety assessment
methodology that combines Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment (C-FHA) with Bayesian probability and decision
framework to supplement existing safety analysis techniques.
C-FHA utilizes available system performance models to compute safety critical metrics of interest under continuous
functional degradation scenarios. The computed safety critical metrics can be analysed by decision makers to assign
hazard severity to functional degradation scenarios. When system architectural and performance models allow the
determination of component failure in terms of top level functional degradation, the generated hazard severity curves
can be utilized to allocate failure rate requirements at the component level.
Instead of merely using data, Bayesian probability assessment utilizes information - consisting of data, models,
and other available information like SME knowledge. A Bayesian probability assessment thus allows the analyst to
provide a comprehensive treatment of aleatory as well as epistemic uncertainty. Finally, a Bayesian decision framework
described allows analysts and decision makers to make a determination on compliance findings through a mathematically
defensible framework.
The major contribution of this paper is the integration of Bayesian inference and decision methods with C-FHA
to create a methodology for risk assessment that is applicable to any system under consideration. A case study was
provided to help readers understand the methodology better by demonstrating it on a simplistic problem. Future work
will look at combining this methodology with the aircraft preliminary sizing process to include reliability requirements
and compliance considerations early in aircraft design. Additional case studies on transformational aviation concepts in
GA, as well as on the More-Electric Aircraft will be considered for the future.
Appendix
A. TOFL Required under Continuous Power Degradation
The derivation of TOFL under power loss presented here is inspired by the work of Armstrong [14]. For a successful
take-off, the TOFL is decomposed into (i) ground roll (sg), (ii) rotation (sR), and (iii) Climb for clearing obstacle
(sobs) [40]. In case of a critical thrust loss during take-off before the decision speed VD , the Balance Field Length (BFL)






































(CD − µrCL) (23)
Eq. 21 gives the distance covered by the aircraft under ground roll when a thrust T acts on it. In case of a failure just













where KT is evaluated at V = 0.7 · VTO for the present case. To compute the decision speed of the aircraft, the ground
roll for the braking phase is calculated by assuming the pilot cuts the power upon failure, and applies breaks. Thus, the
thrust term in Eq. 22 is set to zero, and rolling friction coefficient µr in Eq. 23 is replaced by the braking coefficient µB















(CD − µBCL) (27)
Eq. 25 gives the distance needed to stop and aircraft from the decision speed while reducing thrust to zero and
applying breaks. The Balanced Field Length (BFL) is given as,
BFL = sg1 + sg2 (28)
For a given runway length, the speed at which the difference between runway length and BFL is zero can be obtained
through a fixed point iteration. This speed is called the decision speed VD , reaching which an aircraft has no choice but
to continue take-off procedure. Thus, the critical safety case is when a loss of thrust occurs just after the decision speed.
In such cases, the TOFL is given by,
TOFL = sg1 + sg f ail + sR + sobs (29)
where sg f ail is the distance covered by the aircraft to reach the take-off velocity VTO from VD under a thrust degradation
scenario. Since the case study deals with a fuel cell powered propeller aircraft, power available is the quantity of interest.
The rest of the terms required to compute TOFL are given as,



















sR = 1 · VTO (32)
where the distance required to rotate and clear the obstacle is calculated using equations provided by Anderson [40].
B. Component Failure Data
Battery Compressor
# Failures yi Operating Time ti (hrs) # Failures yi Operating Time ti (hrs)
8.5 5 · 106 0 0.0978 · 106
1 1, 564, 315 1 0.125 · 106
7 4, 651, 560 2 0.0595 · 106
0 506, 426 11 0.0544 · 106
Table 6 Component failure data obtained from databases [41, 42]
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